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Near East and South Asia Review



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8 May 1987

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
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
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Recently announced economic reforms, designed primarily to improve the efficiency of Iraqi industries, are also intended to show that the government can embark on bold economic measures while stopping Iranian invasion attempts. In the process President Saddam Husayn is weakening the influence of economic czar Ramadan and the Ba'th Party.

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Iran: Religious Aspects of Regime Resilience

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The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of economic hardship, political stress, and war weariness. This resilience stems in part from religious elements peculiar to Iran including the cult of martyrdom and the notion of a constant struggle between good and evil.

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India's policymakers—probably influenced by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's penchant for "expert" advice—are looking increasingly to think tanks for policy research and advice. The think tanks' influence is limited, however, by the lack of institutional ties to the government and the competition of the federal bureaucracy.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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Sudan: Khartoum's
Refugee Problems

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b3 [redacted]
The refugees, both Sudanese and foreign nationals, are being blamed for the country's economic ills and rising crime statistics. [redacted] the international concern that has arisen over the campaign is forcing the government to be more cautious in its approach.

With international pressure increasing and with the onset of summer heat and the Ramadan fast which impede government action, we believe Sudan will refrain from further actions against the refugees in the near term. Unless some effort is made to resolve the country's refugee problem, however, repression may be a recurrent feature of the government's response to the refugee influx.

Khartoum's Refugees

b3 Khartoum's refugees include displaced persons primarily from southern Sudan, who have fled north because of the war in the south, and political refugees from surrounding countries. [redacted]

Political refugees come primarily from the Eritrean province of Ethiopia but also from other African states experiencing civil unrest or political repression. [redacted]

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[redacted] An international aid study estimated in 1984 that there were approximately 200,000 Ethiopian refugees alone in Sudan's three largest eastern cities—Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Kassala.

The fighting in southern Sudan is contributing heavily to the body of refugees as displaced Sudanese flee north to escape the effects of the conflict. Both the insurgents and the government are using food supplies as a weapon. Farmers in the south have refrained from planting because the crops are regularly pillaged. Many from the rural areas have taken refuge in cities, abandoning their land, further reducing food

production. [redacted] b3

[redacted] the lack of food and security and the desire for schooling and steady jobs have encouraged southerners to escape to the north where there is at least hope for a better life.

Fleeing wars or political harassment, most foreign refugees arrive in Sudan by walking across the country's unmonitored borders and making their way to Khartoum. Many of the Ethiopians first go to camps on Sudan's border with Ethiopia and then make their way to Khartoum. [redacted] b1 b3

There are three levels of refugee life in Khartoum. The best off are those that have relatives who will help support them until they can find work to support themselves. The next are those in refugee settlements strategically placed outside city limits, often in garbage dumps, yet supplied with food, water, and some medical aid. The last group is forced to set up makeshift huts in unfinished houses within the city. These are usually unregistered refugees, primarily Ethiopians, and are the most in need of aid.

Deteriorating living conditions have contributed to growing tension in Khartoum. Sudan's capital city, which does not have the public services to support itself in the best of circumstances, is especially burdened with the growing influx of refugees. Food prices have increased, putting an adequate diet out of reach of the poorest groups. Government statistics claim criminal behavior such as alcohol production and sale and prostitution have risen. Local residents regard refugees as competitors for jobs, food, and medical care.

Recent Government Actions

The government, in effect, is using the refugee population as a scapegoat for Khartoum's economic ills. Beginning in March 1987 the government ordered

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the police to reduce the refugee population, according to a press report. The main focus was on foreign refugees because displaced Sudanese have advocates within the government who defend their rights. All, however, were affected. The police began arresting refugees as well as forcing whole neighborhoods to move away from Khartoum.

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many of the arrested refugees were beaten, and some required medical treatment. Homes were entered and sacked. There were hearsay reports of women being abused sexually (the women refused to be interviewed). Many refugees were forced to pay bribes or were robbed of the cash they had on hand. Often the police destroyed official identification cards, placing the refugee in an unofficial status and therefore subject to further arrest. Refugees, afraid of further abuse, have been reluctant to register complaints with Sudanese officials,

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Outlook

If the war in the south escalates or even continues at its present pace, southerners will continue to migrate north. Moreover, the Ethiopian refugees will probably remain in Khartoum as long as the Ethiopian situation remains chaotic. Deteriorating economic conditions or a search for scapegoats could prompt repeated crackdowns on refugees. In the worst case, fighting could break out between the refugee population and the police which could result in the wholesale slaughter of refugees.

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**Syria-Lebanon: Damascus's
Options in the
Beirut Quicksand** b3

The nearly 10,000 Syrian troops sent to West Beirut and its environs in February have succeeded somewhat in imposing order in the city but have yet to confront their toughest opponents—the Iranian-supported radical Shia Hizballah and the pro-Arafat Palestinians. Syrian President Assad views both organizations—increasingly allied to each other tactically—as intolerable threats to his influence over events in Lebanon because neither looks to Damascus for guidance. Although Assad wants to delay direct military confrontation with both organizations—partly in hopes of reaping political gains from his troop deployment—he probably cannot avoid a showdown indefinitely. b3

The security situation in West Beirut already has begun to deteriorate and threatens to preempt Assad's efforts to use his military intervention in the city to exact political concessions. Pressure on his troops to take tougher military action is increasing daily. Growing tactical cooperation between Hizballah and the Palestinians in attacks on the Syrians compounds the danger that Assad's tenuous security plan will collapse. b3

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Press reports indicate a bomb exploded in a Syrian barracks in Jiyah, south of Beirut, killing several Syrian soldiers. Syrian intelligence arrested about 60 bombing suspects recently, many of whom allegedly were paid by Fatah to conduct attacks against Syrian military personnel in West Beirut. b3

Factors Leading to the February Intervention

Assad recognized the risks involved in sending his troop to West Beirut but viewed the move as the only way to reassert Syrian influence in Lebanon. His most

important surrogate militia in Lebanon, the moderate Shia Amal, had held Palestinian camps under siege for six months—with Syrian support—but had failed to break the Palestinian resistance. With Amal growing disillusioned and its unity breaking down, Assad had no other surrogate through which he could accomplish his objectives in Lebanon. He also may have estimated that by demonstrating resolve to address common concerns in Lebanon—such as the hostage crisis and Hizballah's expanding influence—he could repair his image with the West—particularly the United States and Great Britain. b3

At the time of the Syrian troop deployment to West Beirut, signs of Syria's weakened position in Lebanon included:

- The failure of Amal to crush the pro-Arafat fighters in the Palestinian refugee camps.
- The growing strength and autonomy of radical Lebanese Shias in the pro-Iranian Hizballah organization.
- The reemergence in West Beirut of leftist Lebanese militias that—were aiding the Palestinians in the battles against Amal.
- Assad's inability to influence Hizballah regarding the foreign hostages in Lebanon. b3

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
In our view, Assad also was particularly eager to improve his international image after the Hindawi trial in London last October exposed Syria's central role in the attempt to bomb an El Al passenger jet six months earlier. Assad almost certainly hoped that by restoring order in West Beirut and possibly securing the release of some of the hostages, the United States and Great Britain would relax some of their diplomatic and commercial restrictions imposed on Syria after the trial. b3

Assad's Strategy Pays Off—So Far

Assad's decision to send troops into West Beirut began to pay off almost immediately, providing him with new leverage in the Lebanon arena. Brig. Gen.


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Security Situation, Late April 1987



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Ghazi Kan'an, Syrian Military Intelligence chief in Lebanon, warned that Damascus would "strike with an iron fist at all those who upset public order." Syrian troops carried out Kan'an's ultimatum, shooting any militiamen daring to carry weapons on West Beirut streets. Within a week the troops had succeeded in getting most militiamen off the streets, forced most Hizballah fighters to abandon their strongholds outside the predominantly Shia southern suburbs, and pressed Amal to lift the siege of the Palestinian camps. [REDACTED]

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Assad almost certainly realized from the outset that his plan could backfire and drag his troops into a long and bloody fight in the streets of Beirut. To discourage potential obstructionists, he demonstrated his readiness to use force by sending about 200 armored vehicles—tanks and infantry fighting vehicles—to Beirut International Airport and the town of Khaldah, just south of Beirut. Nonetheless, several limitations soon became evident:

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The Syrian intervention disillusioned many Amal militiamen who saw it as preventing victory against the Palestinian camps. They were slow to cooperate in Syrian-arranged cease-fires.

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- The Syrians could not seize all weapons caches and small arms from West Beirut militiamen. They conducted some house-to-house searches for arms but did not resort to the brutal mopping up tactics they have used in the past against Sunni residents of Tripoli and against Muslim Brotherhood suspects in the Syrian city of Hamah in 1982.

greater numbers of Syrian troops to Sidon.

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Assad is unlikely to redeploy a significant number of troops from the Beirut area to Sidon, particularly if Syrian-Hizballah relations in the capital remain potentially explosive. If he decides the situation in Sidon warrants a more direct and sizable Syrian military commitment, he probably would have to deploy additional forces into Lebanon from Syria—a move he almost certainly wants to avoid.

Sidestepping Hizballah

In our view, Assad wants to delay military confrontation with Hizballah as long as possible, preferring to reap whatever political gains he can by appearing to have the upper hand in West Beirut. Accordingly, he appears so far to have denied, at least publicly, the seriousness of attacks against his troops in West Beirut in order to sidestep an immediate need for Syrian military action. Syrian officials in West Beirut even denied that the Jiyah barracks were bombed on 21 April, despite press reports on casualties and the ambulance traffic between Jiyah and Beirut. Barring continued mediation by Damascus with Hizballah leaders or their Tehran backers, there is a high risk that the isolated clashes occurring between Syrian soldiers and Hizballah fighters will expand into a costlier confrontation in the Hizballah-dominated southern suburbs.

Battles Ahead

Syria's distribution in April of several truckloads of weapons and ammunition to Amal fighters in the Sidon area—Arafat's main stronghold in Lebanon—and stationing of about 100-150 Syrian troops along the coastal road north of the city suggest that Assad will encourage Amal to renew its siege of the Palestinian camps around Sidon. Assad probably will move gradually against the Palestinians, however, because he does not want to provoke criticism from Arab states and the Soviet Union, especially so soon after the Palestine National Council's meeting in Algiers and his own trip to Moscow. Assad probably will continue bolstering Amal militiamen in Sidon by delivering more weapons and supplies to them and infiltrating more Syrian troops as advisers, if necessary.

Although Assad prefers to use Amal in attacks against the Sidon-based Palestinians, he almost certainly is gauging the risks involved in deploying

Assad may recognize that any attempt to eradicate Hizballah by force would be counterproductive. Attacks would weaken Hizballah initially, but over time the organization probably would profit by attracting sympathizers from the already splintered Lebanese Shia community and, possibly, Lebanese leftists. The costs to Damascus would be high and

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possibly include broken relations with Tehran, Hizbullah terrorist attacks inside Syria, and increased radicalism among Lebanese Shias. To increase Damascus's difficulties and embarrassment, Hizbullah might also kill some or all of the hostages.

Assad's strategy instead may be to try to press Tehran to abandon its support for Hizballah. He might threaten to prohibit Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel, their supplies, and Hizballah officials from transiting Damascus Airport between Tehran and Lebanon. He may also move more forcefully to shut down Iranian and Hizballah facilities around Ba'labakk, where major elements of the Syrian 93rd Armored Brigade are located. b3

Greater Beirut Security

Syrian leaders have spoken of expanding their security plan to East Beirut by having the Lebanese Army take control of the Christian areas and removing—by force if necessary—the Lebanese


Forces militia. This proposal will remain a long shot, in our view, particularly as long as the Syrian-Lebanese presidential dialogue is stalled.

We believe Assad wants to avoid deeper commitments in Beirut, but events beyond his control may force him further into the morass. Although Ghazi Kan'an has said "Lebanon is only quicksand for enemies, not for those who are of the same people," it is unlikely that Syria can control the situation in Beirut while occupying only parts of the city. Should Assad decide that he must move against Hizballah or the PLO, we believe his assessment of the potential gains in his relationship with the United States will be an important, although not preeminent, factor in his decisionmaking.

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
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Iraq's Economic Changes: Political Implications

Recently announced economic reforms, designed primarily to improve the efficiency of Iraqi industries, are also intended to show that the government can embark on bold economic measures while stopping Iranian invasion attempts. In the process, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn appears to be weakening the influence of First Deputy Prime Minister and economic czar Taha Yasin Ramadan, his strongest rival on the Revolutionary Command Council. The measures are also likely to erode the decisionmaking authority of the ruling Ba'th Party.

Ba'th Economic Ideology

The Iraqi Ba'th Party's allegiance to socialism developed during the days when it was out of power. The Ba'thists grafted socialism onto their main tenet, Arab nationalism, to broaden their appeal in competition with leftist political parties in the late 1950s, according to academic studies. The Ba'thists, for example, shared an identical platform with Egyptian President Nasir—Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. The Ba'thists have never felt comfortable with socialism, and it has remained the vaguest of the party's goals.

The Ba'thists have grown increasingly unhappy with the inefficiencies in Iraq's socialist economic system. These inefficiencies have been made more burdensome by wartime financial and manpower strains. Because of these factors and Saddam's tight grip on power, he has been able to try some economic experimentation without undue concern for sniping from the party's ideological hardliners. At the last regular party congress in 1982 the need for greater economic efficiency was stressed. Several of the recent changes sought by Saddam were floated at that time. High war casualties and reduced government revenues from lower oil prices have increased the force of these arguments since 1982.

Projecting Confidence

We believe that Saddam's attention to the economy is intended not only to improve its operation but also to persuade the public that Baghdad can both stop

Iranian ground attacks and focus on civilian concerns. The Iraqi Government is projecting a mood of almost pugnacious confidence, bragging about Tehran's failure to defeat Iraq during Iran's widely touted Year of Decision, which ended in March. In our view, extensive domestic media coverage of the economic reforms and calls for greater effort by the populace are intended to reinvigorate civilian support for the war by underscoring the importance of individuals' effort, rewarding their work, and holding out hope of an eventual return to normal.

Ramadan: A Target of the Reforms?

The economic policy changes have led to speculation about the power and status of First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan, long a key player in Iraq's politics and economy. Animosity between Saddam and Ramadan, never far below the surface, erupted last July and led, in part, to an extraordinary regional congress of the Ba'th Party.

Moreover, Saddam probably grudgingly valued Ramadan's decisive handling of economic matters and his willingness and ability to implement unpopular but necessary austerity measures.

Baghdad's recent economic policy changes include:

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The elimination of the distinction between technocrats and workers probably will enable workers to move into jobs where they are needed more.

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Weakening of the Ba'th Party

the economic reforms reflect, in part, Saddam's efforts to enhance his influence at the expense of the Ba'th Party.

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If this view is correct, the party members—cut off from mass organizations—will be increasingly reduced in importance.

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Outlook and Implications

The rapid and dramatic nature of the economic reforms suggests that Saddam is committed to a course that gives more emphasis in the economy to the private sector at the expense of the public sector. He appears confident that he can enact them over any opposition in the Ba'th Party. These moves are an acceleration of a trend that the Ba'thists initiated early in the 1980s. Ramadan and others closely identified with centralized socialism are likely to see their power erode at the expense of reformers

Saddam's repeated public warnings to foot-draggers and "deviationists" suggest—not suprisingly—that some government and party officials are resisting the reforms. Saddam's shuffling of ministry posts and his readiness to replace officials who stand in his way make significant opposition unlikely.

If Ramadan is ousted from the Revolutionary Command Council, this would remove one of the few strong figures in Iraqi politics and a principal contender to succeed Saddam Husayn. The remaining potential successors on the Council are Saddam loyalists, deputy party leader Izzat Ibrahim and Minister of Defense Adnan Khayrallah, Saddam's cousin and brother-in-law. Ramadan is not known to have a significant following in the military or security services. Although many longtime Ba'thists probably would resent the removal or demotion of a dedicated party worker, they would be unlikely to move in Ramadan's defense. Many Ba'thists, however, will be unhappy over the growing concentration of power in the hands of Saddam and his relatives, and this could be the basis for future difficulties for Saddam.

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Iran: Religious Aspects of Regime Resilience

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The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of economic hardship, political stress, and war weariness. This resilience stems in part from a set of religious elements peculiar to Iran. Key among these elements are the cult of martyrdom in Iranian Shiism and the notion of a constant struggle between good and evil. The Khomeini regime carefully manipulates these elements in Iranian religious belief to legitimize its authority. The regime is helped by the passivity of Iranians in their relationship with authority, the strong ties between the clergy and the people, and Ayatollah Khomeini's unique position as arbiter in a theocratic republic.

Martyrdom and the Fight Against Evil

In Shia religious belief as practiced in Iran, good is constantly at war with evil, which will attempt to corrupt through seduction and blandishment. The faithful, therefore, must engage in an active campaign to thwart evil.

The Khomeini regime has manipulated this belief through its encouragement of martyrdom and its vilification of the West. Iran is presented as a bastion for the oppressed, a republic dedicated to upholding the Islamic way of living. As such it is a target for the encroaching forces of evil, personified by the Western countries and their surrogates, the Iraqi Ba'thists. The Khomeini regime maintains that under the Shah Westerners were given full control in Iran. Western culture corrupted Iranian youth and brought disruption. This situation was rectified when the Westerners were expelled by the Islamic revolution. Only by constant vigilance, following Islamic strictures, and behaving in ways that encourage others to follow can the forces of evil be kept distant.

Iran's cult of martyrdom is tied to this notion of vigilance. The Islamic revolution modified the Iranian perception of Imam Husayn, a grandson of Muhammad and the preeminent martyr of Iranian

Shiism.¹ Before the revolution, Iranians viewed Husayn in almost mystical terms as a holy person. One could attempt to curry his favor by honoring him and invoking his name. With the Islamic revolution, Husayn became a figure to be emulated. Khomeini compared the Shah to Yazid, Husayn's opponent and the personification of supreme evil in Iranian Shiism. Khomeini likened the anti-Shah demonstrators to Husayn for their willingness to sacrifice themselves to fight oppression and build a just society. In becoming martyrs they, too would be worthy of emulation.

The Iranian Government has exploited this martyr cult to garner popular support for the war with Iraq. The Ba'thist Iraqi Government is presented as the surrogate for the Western forces of corruption. The Khomeini regime calls on the Iranian people to sacrifice in the manner of Husayn. As Husayn gave his life, so must the fighter; as Husayn's partisans suffered deprivation, so must the Iranian people. Only then can evil be thwarted and Iran remain pure. The Iranian press prints stories of martyrs, their final wishes and aspirations, and presents them as models to be emulated. Publications oriented toward children call on them to prepare themselves for martyrdom.

The Elemental Role of the Clergy

The Iranian clergy have strong connections among the people, particularly with the urban and rural poor. Through religious gatherings, the clergy take part in the life of the people. To those who have recently migrated to the city these religious rituals provide a sense of community. In return, the urban poor support a number of clerical organizations, such as the

¹ According to Shia tradition, Imam Husayn was divinely invested with the leadership of the Islamic community. His leadership was usurped, however, by Yazid. Although outnumbered, Imam Husayn chose to challenge Yazid's godlessness and to set an example for future generations of Muslims to rise up against tyranny and injustice. Imam Husayn's small army was annihilated by the forces of Yazid at Kerbala in 680 A.D.

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Children and Martyrdom

The Islamic republic makes use of role models to encourage children to accept martyrdom. In articles prepared for children, the stories of martyrs often are romanticized. In one children's publication a frontline soldier tells the interviewer that he thinks not of his brother who was seriously wounded, but of his friend who was martyred. In closing the interview, the soldier states that he, too, wishes to be martyred.

Another example contrasts the lives of two Iranian women: Zahra, who follows Islamic strictures, and Ferank, who observes a Western lifestyle. Zahra is the perfect Muslim student. She observes Islamic dress codes and has adopted a local martyr, Mohsen, as her role model. She supports the sending of adolescents to the front and draws pictures of their military exploits. Ferank leads a life of frivolity. She does not observe Islamic dress codes or seek to set a good example for others. Instead she is concerned merely with laughter and beauty.

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fundamentalist Feda'yin al-Islam that carried out assassinations of government officials deemed anti-Islamic during the Shah's reign.

The komiteh system, whereby the mosque cares for local needs, is an outgrowth of these religious gatherings and provides a mechanism for regime

control. During the revolution rationing and demonstrations were coordinated through the mosques, and many of the pious look to the local clergy for guidance. The clergy's role is reinforced by the Shia belief in acquiring merit by doing good works and by the fact that in the tight social environment of the village or neighborhood one is judged by one's peers. The regime sets standards for behavior that are then transmitted through the komiteh network. Violators are liable to suffer immediate clerical and popular rebuke. This system enhances the regime's leverage to act as the ultimate arbiter of society. Because they are so influential, the Iranian Government attempts to control the appointments of Friday prayer leaders.

Khomeini as Arbiter

Ayatollah Khomeini derives much of his power from his position as marja taqlid—a cleric qualified to rule on theological issues. Credulous Iranian Shias revere marja taqlids as intercessors with the divine, and they believe that following the teachings of one will bring the believer special merit. Through this position Khomeini can legitimate the notion of Islamic government. Khomeini also sanctions revolutionary hagiography that identifies him with Imam Husayn as a destroyer of evil. This has exploited the ingrained Iranian tradition of a strong ruler, one who does not submit to anyone, to provide support to Islamic rule.

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India's Think Tanks ~~SECRET~~ b3

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India's policymakers—

—are looking increasingly to think tanks for policy research and advice. Gandhi meets occasionally with researchers to discuss political and government issues, and his secretariat includes a number of former think tank staff members. Nonetheless, government officials use private policy research and analysis only on a personalized, ad hoc basis, and India's large network of independent foreign, defense, and domestic policy institutes does not have a tradition of close ties to the government. Think tanks compete with layers of federal bureaucracy that separate them from government decisionmakers.

How Think Tanks Work in India

India has a multitude of think tanks largely staffed by social scientists, ex-journalists, and retired military personnel who publish research and analysis on political/security issues and domestic and economic policy. Although the central government has a research clearinghouse designed to solicit analysis from think tanks, the institutes' influence is largely restricted to the personal access their members may have to individual policymakers.

The ICSSR is designed to serve only as a means to forward government research proposals to consultants, who then advise ICSSR which proposals should be funded. A figurehead director and a corps of powerful research department heads administer the ICSSR.

How Gandhi and His Advisers Use Think Tanks

Although Gandhi has not changed how government and independent policy researchers formally interact, he is more open than his predecessors to nongovernment ideas, and he sporadically calls in members of various think tanks to discuss policy options. For example, last March the Prime Minister's secretariat commissioned a study of Gandhi's performance during his first two years in office.

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Foundations, public-sector companies, and state governments also back think tanks. The ICSSR's mandate covers research, fellowships, foreign collaboration, and funding for about 20 research institutes. The quasi-government Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, perhaps India's most influential think tank, is the only major institute that does not follow the ICSSR funding pattern.

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Major Think Tanks

Center for Policy Research (CPR). One of New Delhi's most successful social science research institutes, CPR's influence has grown under Rajiv Gandhi, who occasionally meets with its staff to discuss political/philosophical issues, according to the Embassy. The Center's staff includes well-known foreign affairs commentator Bhabani Sen Gupta and former MIT economist Isher Ahluwalia, wife of Montek Ahluwalia, a highly respected economist in the Prime Minister's secretariat.

Center for the Study of India's Development in the Modern World (CSDS). CSDS, the grandfather of Indian think tanks, was created in 1962 when a handful of academics left teaching for full-time research.

Economic Institutes. [REDACTED] the eight main economic research institutes around New Delhi have more established institutional ties than those of the social science and foreign policy think tanks. The economic institutes also have more influence in New Delhi than other policy institutes. When Rajiv Gandhi came to power, he staffed key finance, planning, and industry posts with young economic theorists, and the economists who remain associated with the research institutes provide intellectual backing for the economic liberalization policies designed and implemented by their government counterparts. The major economic research institutes include the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Economic Statistics Research Center, and National Council of Applied Economic Research.

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One researcher cites recent examples of the Ministry of External Affairs commissioning a paper on India's regional relations and several ministries submitting draft policy papers on education and public-sector pricing for review by research institutes [REDACTED]

We believe Indian policymakers also value press articles for their alternative policy ideas—much the same way they use think tanks. The Indian press often runs articles written by senior think tank analysts outlining alternative viewpoints and crystallizing

debates on key issues. For example, the Times of India ran a hawkish article by IDSA director K. Subramaniam attributing the Indo-Pakistani border confrontation in January to Pakistani "provocation." The paper also printed a rebuttal from Pran Chopra, senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research.

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The Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA)

The IDSA was created in 1967 to promote advanced study and analysis of defense and security issues. The institute is affiliated with the Defense Ministry as a quasi-government body and receives about 85 percent of its funding from the Ministry.

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IDSA conducts research on topics of concern to individual researchers and publishes its studies with an eye to influencing public and policymaker opinion. The IDSA publishes a quarterly (IDSA Journal), two monthlies (Strategic Analysis and Strategic Digest), and periodic reviews of technology and global regions. IDSA staffers—direct hires to the institute—do not have security clearances for classified work. Because Indian defense and security information is strictly protected, few have enough access to security policy to be able to contest it ~~XXXXXX~~

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
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Pakistan: Emerging
Unemployment Problems [REDACTED] b3

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Unemployment is becoming an increasingly significant economic problem and political issue in Pakistan. [REDACTED] projections, based on poor quality data, suggest that 3.8 million people—almost 11 percent of the labor force—could be without jobs by the end of Pakistan's next five-year plan in 1993, up from about 5 percent in 1985. Long-term trends toward greater capital intensity in industry and agriculture, as well as the return of workers from the Middle East, explain much of the expected deterioration. Political leaders are emphasizing the need to create more jobs, especially for educated youth. [REDACTED] b3

Growing Unemployment

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In the period 1972-85, according to Pakistani statistics, employment almost kept pace with the 2.9 percent annual growth in the domestic labor force. Until recently, net migration of workers to jobs in the Middle East also provided significant relief from potential unemployment problems. Real wages for skilled workers and for agricultural labor probably rose during the decade before 1984. [REDACTED] and survey data, [REDACTED] b (1) b (3)

Overall unemployment in Pakistan is almost surely greater than the 3.5-3.9-percent rate reported in government surveys.¹ Survey data show a marked increase between 1983 and 1985 in unemployment among educated workers in urban areas—from 2.3 [REDACTED] b3

unpaid family workers are "employed" if they work at least 15 hours. In addition, underreporting of female labor by male heads of households probably leads to underestimation of labor force participation and unemployment rates. The 1985 unemployment rate would have been 5 percent if all persons in the labor force who work less than 15 hours a week were defined as unemployed [REDACTED] b3

percent to 7 percent for university graduates and from 4.8 percent to 9 percent for workers with some postsecondary education. [REDACTED] b (3)

Causes

International Migration. In 1983 overseas employment was equivalent to approximately 6 to 7 percent of the domestic work force. [REDACTED] b3
[REDACTED] The exodus of these workers not only reduced the supply of labor, but remittances increased incomes and the demand for goods and services—and therefore labor—within Pakistan. [REDACTED] b3

A sharp reduction in the number of workers leaving for employment overseas—from 173,000 in 1982 to about 90,000 in 1985—probably marked the start of a deterioration in Pakistan's employment situation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So far, however, most returning workers seem to have reentered the Pakistani labor force without great difficulty. [REDACTED] b (1) b (3)

[REDACTED] Perhaps 20 percent remain jobless for extended periods, according to the more pessimistic of two 1986 surveys, but Pakistani officials believe they do so by choice until they find a job to their liking. According to 1986 surveys, workers bring back accumulated savings, a stronger self-image, and sometimes new skills, so that many attempt to shift from unskilled labor to small entrepreneurship. [REDACTED] b3

Longer Term Trends. We believe population growth and changes in demand for labor are causing more unemployment than the change in international migration. Because fertility rates were high in the past—and still are—Pakistan's labor force has been growing rapidly. At the same time, changes in [REDACTED] b3

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Afghan Refugees

Afghan refugees are probably not a major factor in the national unemployment problem, although in northwestern Pakistan their casual and seasonal work to supplement refugee benefits may have driven down wage rates somewhat. Pushtun competition for jobs in other parts of the country, sometimes attributed to refugees, probably comes from Pakistani nationals. The presence of the refugees may have spurred Pushtun migration from the northwest, adding to unemployment problems in other parts of Pakistan.

agriculture and manufacturing have been reducing the number of workers needed per unit of output.

Mechanization and commercialization of agriculture are making it profitable for large- and medium-size farms to replace permanent hired labor or tenants with fewer hours of casual labor. These labor displacing consequences of changes in agricultural technology are becoming increasingly important. Census data indicate that nonfarm workers have already become a larger share of the rural labor force, rising from 25 percent in 1972 to 30 percent in 1981.

Earlier steps to modernize agriculture increased demand for labor. Extension of irrigation brought more land under cultivation. Technical changes that began with the Green Revolution of the 1960s permitted intensified use of land to yield more than one crop per year and required more hours of labor to make effective use of purchased inputs such as fertilizer.

Industrial trends presage growing difficulty in adding employees at the same time as the population shift from rural areas to towns and from towns to cities in Punjab and Sind is apparently accelerating. Even small-scale industries, which account for 90 percent of the industrial labor force and need much less investment per employee, are becoming more capital

intensive. Entrepreneurs sometimes find machines easier to manage—and easier to lay off or work overtime—than poorly trained, illiterate workers.

Political Response

Government concern about unemployment is rising rapidly. Prime Minister Junejo has directed that top priority be accorded projects that create additional employment, particularly for the educated unemployed. His Five-Point Economic Program for rural development and social services, which was announced in mid-1986, includes comprehensive employment plans, and, in March 1987, Junejo promised to offer jobs to all unemployed doctors and engineers. The chief minister of the North West Frontier Province has repeatedly described unemployment as the biggest problem facing his government. President Zia, less alarmist, recently noted that unemployment may become a major problem during the next few years.

Opposition parties have also taken up the unemployment theme. Benazir Bhutto noted that job creation would be the main focus of her economic policies. The labor policy that her Pakistan People's Party announced in April 1987, however, focuses on benefits for workers who are already employed.

Outlook

Pakistan's unemployment problem is likely to become more severe over the next several years. Present patterns of labor use and 5.5 percent annual growth in gross domestic product indicate that the national unemployment rate could grow to 11 percent by 1993. Faster overall growth or lower real wages would provide more jobs. Foreign payments problems that resulted in austerity would lead to even higher unemployment.

The politics of unemployment is likely to become an increasing problem for the government. Past employment trends suggest that youth with some secondary education but no professional qualifications will bear the brunt of the

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problem. This is the group that is probably most prone to violence and most readily available for political agitation. [REDACTED] b3

Employment problems and ethnic conflict in Karachi, in particular, may intensify as more workers return from jobs in the Middle East. Pushtuns are overrepresented among overseas migrants compared with their share in the total population, and many lived in Karachi before leaving for overseas employment. Lack of growth in employment opportunities in northwestern Pakistan could also result in an increase in the Pushtun share of Karachi's population and therefore in the potential for conflict. Karachi already suffers far greater ethnic violence and has more disaffected youth than any other city in the country. [REDACTED]

returning workers will be too small and their return stretched over too long a period to lower national wage rates significantly. [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] the political focus on providing public-sector jobs for doctors, teachers, and engineers is an inappropriate response to pressure from a small group and is likely to waste money through overstaffing. [REDACTED] a revision of trade and industrial policies that favor capital-intensive production. It also calls for additional training and credit to promote small-scale industries and self-employment in agricultural services. [REDACTED] b3 b3

Elsewhere in Pakistan, problems caused by changes in international migration may not be severe. [REDACTED] Pakistani officials do not see unemployment of returning workers as a potential cause of political unrest in the near future. [REDACTED] the number of [REDACTED] b3

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Pakistan: Dacoits Complicate Law-and-Order Problems

Dacoitry (the South Asian term for banditry) has become one of the most persistent law-and-order problems in Pakistan. Dacoit gangs terrorize local citizens, primarily in Sind Province, with almost daily kidnappings, burglaries, and highway robberies.

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Dacoitry: A Part of Cultural History

Dacoits are deeply rooted in Sindhi society. They have long served landlords and religious leaders in rural Sind as protectors of property and enforcers of authority within areas under their control. In return for sustenance and sanctuary, the dacoits harassed their patrons' rivals and kept the peasants in line.

b3 In recent years, the ties between dacoits and landlords have loosened, and the dacoits have asserted their independence. Several factors have contributed to this newfound assertiveness but point to the demonstrations in 1983 by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy—the primary opposition alliance in Pakistan—as the most significant. They believe the government's failure to suppress the demonstrations exposed its weakness and emboldened existing gangs to expand their activities.

Dacoit Gangs

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b3 the dacoits may number more than 1,000. There are occasional suggestions in [redacted] that the dacoits are politically motivated.

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[redacted] During the last year, dacoits have expanded their membership by recruiting students on university campuses.

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[redacted] (The dacoits guarantee their recruits a monthly income of 4,000 to 5,000 rupees—approximately \$250 to \$300—comparable to Pakistan's annual per capita income.)

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Successful tactics and better arms are heartening the dacoits. Journalists say the dacoits stormed the Sukkur prison and freed 34 death row prisoners in March 1986.

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[redacted] The dacoits have also gained access to more sophisticated equipment, including Kalashnikov rifles and even some rocket launchers.

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[redacted] The expanded market in part reflects the war in Afghanistan.

The dacoits operate primarily in the forest areas along the Indus River in the northern and central regions of Sind Province.

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[redacted] The southern part of Sind Province—the area immediately around Karachi—has not been troubled by the bandits.

Robberies are the dacoits' most common activity. Gangs regularly attack cars, buses, and trucks traveling on

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the highway. They establish roadblocks and frequently impersonate police officers. Few people now travel Sind highways after dark. Truckers have resorted to forming convoys to transit the roads and, on one occasion last fall, staged a three-day strike to underscore their need for protection.

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It is not unusual, for a smaller gang to stage the kidnaping and then sell its captive to more powerful gangs for a portion of the expected ransom. The groups turn to intermediaries, usually local landlords, to negotiate the release.

Police Countermeasures

The police have not been effective in curbing dacoit activity.

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The dramatic expansion of dacoit activity during 1986 prompted Prime Minister Junejo to authorize sterner measures. He ordered Pakistani paramilitary forces into Sind last fall for a major crackdown on dacoits. A heavyhanded approach that included hundreds of arrests (many of those arrested were believed to be innocent by local residents) and the destruction of several villages raised concerns about the government's inclination to resort to what was interpreted as martial law tactics. The antidacoit drive also prompted accusations that it was staged primarily to intimidate political opponents.

Security officials continue to conduct periodic campaigns against dacoits, but in recent months they have concentrated on winning the cooperation of affected villagers.

As part of their antidacoit campaign, the police are harassing villages in which the majority of inhabitants traditionally have made their living through criminal activity and have encouraged villagers to form small militias to protect their region. With the assistance of the paramilitary forces, patrols have been increased along the main highways.

Outlook

Despite improved police efforts, Islamabad is unlikely to make a significant dent in dacoitry any time soon. The tradition of banditry is well entrenched in the region. Local residents fear dacoit reprisals more than they fear police action and probably will continue to provide support to the bandits to ward off attacks.

The government—both provincial authorities and Junejo—will come under increasing attack for its inability to find a solution to the problem. The opposition particularly will try to exploit the issue to press its position that there is a need for change in the administration to make the Pakistani people feel secure. Nevertheless, the dacoit problem does not threaten Pakistan's internal stability, although it complicates the already volatile law-and-order situation in Sind Province created by ethnic riots in Karachi.

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The Awami National Party: New Leftist Force in Pakistan

The Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan's newest leftist party, is actively seeking [REDACTED]

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The ANP is also stirring up opposition to US-Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan and narcotics control. Despite the ANP's strong links to Moscow and Kabul, Islamabad has only recently begun to try to curtail the party's activities. [REDACTED]

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The ANP's Nine Lives

The ANP is the latest incarnation of the Khudai Khidmatgaran—"Servants of God"—party that was formed in 1929 by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who came from a prominent Pushtun family in the North West Frontier Province. The Khudai party, which was popularly known as the "Redshirts" because of their reddish-colored uniform, advocated independence from the British colonialists and autonomy for the Pushtuns, the predominant ethnic group in the North West Frontier Province. Ghaffar Khan and his followers rejected the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and continued to insist on a separate "Pushtunistan."

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Ghaffar Khan and his son, Abdul Wali Khan, merged the Redshirts with several other parties in 1957 to form the National Awami Party. This new organization had a leftist platform that called for autonomy for Pakistan's ethnic minorities and socialist economic policies favoring the working class and the poor. The National Awami Party was frequently harassed by the government and was finally banned in 1975. Wali Khan and his supporters joined other leftist parties until July 1986, when he formed the Awami National Party (ANP).

The ANP enunciated its political platform when it held its first public rally in Karachi last July. Wali Khan and other party leaders demanded an end to "US imperialism" in Pakistan and criticized Islamabad's policy of supporting the Afghan resistance and refugees. The party also called for direct talks between Kabul and Islamabad. On domestic matters, ANP speakers at the rally condemned the "domination" of Sind, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province by Punjab. The party called for a new Pakistani constitution that would give greater autonomy to the smaller provinces.

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
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
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
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
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
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The Ministry of Nationalities
and Tribal Affairs—
Kabul's Tribal Weapon

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The Afghan Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs is the regime's primary vehicle for gaining Afghan tribal support and—along with the Ministry of State Security—for destabilizing the Pakistani border region. The Ministry, [REDACTED] has, in our view, had only limited success in achieving its long-term goal of reducing tribal support to the insurgents. [REDACTED]

Organization and History

The Ministry for Nationalities and Tribal Affairs (MNTA) was formed in 1981 when the Afghan regime reorganized the Ministry for Frontier and Tribal Affairs. MNTA Minister Solayman Laeq is a member of the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and is said to be an intimate of PDPA General Secretary Najib, [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] The western zone includes Herat, Farah, and Qandahar Provinces; the eastern zone Konarha, Laghman, and Nangarhar; the northern zone Bamian, Samangan, Balkh, and parts of Ghawr and Oruzgan; the southwest zone Paktika, Paktia, and Ghazni. [REDACTED]

Finance

[REDACTED] the Ministry was financed from three different budgets in 1985. The first budget allotted 275 million afghanis (\$1.7 million at the bazaar rate) in a public budget. A "developing" budget probably aimed at gaining tribal support consisted of 500 million afghanis (\$3.1 million). The Ministry of State Security contributed 1 billion additional afghanis (\$6.2 million) most likely for joint operations involving militia forces and cross-border activity. [REDACTED]

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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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Near East and South Asia Brief

Middle East-
North Africa

Locust Infestations

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Swarms of desert locusts have been sighted in Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan over the past six months. The infestations—the most serious in 60 years—probably will become more of a problem by June because of recent heavy rains, which have produced favorable conditions for breeding and egg hatching. Locust swarms have moderately damaged sorghum and millet crops throughout the region, but food availability has not been affected. North Yemen faces the most serious threat because it does not have enough pesticides to undertake effective ground and aerial spraying against the pests. As a result, North Yemen's banana and date crops could be severely damaged.

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